In Being and Time, Heidegger unveils two existential aspects of the traditional problem of affectivity – namely, findingness (Befindlichkeit) and Attunement (Stimmung). The first concept expresses the facticity of existence, a structure comprising the fact that Dasein has always already accepted itself in its throwness. The second concept expresses the interpretatively structured existentiell modification of findingness. In addition, one has to discern also an ontical, psychical experience of moods. Despite polemical rhetorics of SZ concerning the foundation of attunements in the existential structure of findingness, by way of ontological priority, it remains unclear how in fact to grasp their ontological relation. On the other hand, the tradition of phenomenology of embodiment poses a question of how to understand the relation of findingness, attunements, and embodiment. Is it possible to maintain the transcendental priority of Dasein, and at the same time to integrate the embodied view, and thus articulate a thesis on their constitutitive intertwining? In the present article I shall argue for the said thesis, on the basis of a critique of the transcendentalistic understanding of existence as a formal structure, which exemplifies itself in particular ontic experiences. Against that, I shall argue for an interpretation that the meaning of existence as a unique relation to its throwness requires that it can only exercise itself in concrete, embodied experiences, without having a stand–alone meaning. I shall base my argument on the concept of creative embodied orientation.
